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“A Strange Opposition”:
The Portrait of a Lady
and the Divorce Debates
Melissa J. Ganz, Yale University
Toward the end of The Portrait of a Lady (1881), after Isabel Archer
confides to Henrietta Stackpole that she feels trapped in her marriage to Gilbert
Osmond, Henrietta advises Isabel to “[l]eave [her] husband before the worst
comes” (549). When James’s heroine recoils at “the off-hand” manner in which
Henrietta speaks of withdrawing from the bonds of matrimony, the outspoken
American journalist proceeds to justify her position: “‘Well,’ sa[ys] Henrietta as
if she were beginning an argument, ‘nothing is more common in our Western
cities, and it’s to them, after all, that we must look in the future.’” The reader hears
no more of Henrietta’s ideas, however; the narrator swiftly silences her. “Her
argument,” he tells us, “does not concern this history, which has too many other
threads to unwind.”
Henrietta’s argument, of course, has everything to do with James’s novel—
which is why the narrator so noticeably and anxiously quiets her. Henrietta
threatens to articulate what remains ever present but always implicit in the text:
an argument in favor of divorce. This legal remedy for ill-matched couples was
extremely controversial in nineteenth-century America. While figures such as
Robert Dale Owen and Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued in favor of easing
restrictions on divorce, others—such as New York Tribune Editor Horace Greeley
and Yale College President Theodore Woolsey—railed against the frequency with
which Americans were dissolving their vows.1 Serialized in the Atlantic Monthly
the year that Woolsey helped found the New England Divorce Reform League and
that Congress authorized the gathering of national statistics on marriage and
divorce, The Portrait of a Lady both responds to and participates in heated
debates about the permanence of the conjugal tie.
Scholars have examined James’s portrait of matrimonial misery, but they
have generally overlooked the novel’s treatment of divorce. Insisting upon
James’s commitment to the sanctity of marriage, critics have dismissed the idea
that the text considers divorce as an alternative for Isabel. Allen F. Stein, for
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example, asserts that divorce is “out of the question as both [Isabel] and James see
it” (139). In a similar vein, Alfred Habegger observes that “[d]ivorce as a topic is
strangely absent from Isabel’s life and mind” (“Woman” 163). Debra MacComb
devotes closer attention to the question than most critics do, but she, too, concludes
that the novel emphatically rejects this possibility. Constructing a sharp contrast
between English and American attitudes toward marriage, she maintains that the
novel criticizes Americans’ “celebrated tendency” to elevate individual liberty
over social obligation and to resort to radical breaks such as divorce in order to
secure such liberty (“Divorce of a Nation” 129, see also Tales 53–77).2
James’s treatment of divorce is more complicated than these critics have
recognized. At the same time that the novel insists upon the sanctity of the
conjugal bond, it highlights the costs of remaining in a miserable marriage and it
reaches toward a remedy for Isabel. At many moments the novel imagines the
possibility—indeed, desirability—of dissolving the conjugal tie. The argument
that Henrietta introduces fairly late in the novel is, in fact, woven through the text
from the very beginning. Although the novel ultimately resists Henrietta’s
suggestion, it articulates some of the central arguments in favor of liberal divorce.
In its close examination of both sides of the divorce debates, The Portrait of a
Lady occupies an important place in the tradition of American divorce fiction.3
To understand the implications of Henrietta’s suggestion to Isabel, we need
to consider the legal context of the novel. Henrietta wisely advises Isabel to turn
to American courts, rather than to English or Italian tribunals, as English and
Italian law did not permit a woman in Isabel’s position to dissolve her vows. With
certain limited exceptions, divorce remained illegal in Italy throughout the
nineteenth century (Phillips 405–07). In England, after the passage of the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, a husband could obtain a divorce if he provided
evidence of his wife’s adultery, but a wife needed to show proof of an “aggravating
factor” such as incest, bigamy, cruelty, or desertion for two years, in addition to
adultery, in order to obtain the same remedy. If she showed evidence only of her
husband’s adultery or cruelty or desertion for two years, she could obtain a
judicial separation enabling her to live apart from her spouse but barring her from
remarrying (Shanley 35–44; Stone 378–82, 388).4
Compared with English and Italian law, American divorce law was generally
more liberal, but the specific provisions varied from state to state.5 New York,
Isabel Archer’s original abode, was one of the stricter jurisdictions. New York
courts recognized only one ground—adultery—as the basis for an absolute
divorce, and they permitted only the “innocent” spouse to remarry after receiving
such a decree (Blake 64–66; Hartog 72–73). The courts granted limited divorces,
or separations “from bed and board,” which enabled spouses to live apart but not
to remarry, for three reasons: cruel and inhuman treatment by one spouse toward
the other; conduct that might render it unsafe and improper for one spouse to
cohabit with the other; and abandonment, coupled with refusal or neglect to
provide for the other spouse. The courts interpreted “cruelty” as meaning only
physical brutality (Blake 66; Griswold 128–29).
In other states, such as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Nevada, and Utah—the
notorious “Western states” to which Henrietta alludes—spouses could take back
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their vows much more easily. Courts in these states granted absolute divorces for
any one of a number of reasons, such as desertion, impotence, habitual drunken-
ness, cruelty, and adultery, and they permitted both spouses to remarry after
receiving the decree (Basch 47–48; Blake 62–63, 116–29). Some state codes, such
as Indiana’s, also contained an “omnibus,” or catch-all clause, which enabled
courts to grant divorces for “[a]ny other cause which [they] . . . deem[ed] . . .
proper” (qtd. in Divorce 59). The omnibus clause in Connecticut’s code enabled
courts in that state to grant divorces for “any such misconduct . . . as permanently
destroys the happiness of the petitioner, and defeats the purpose of the marriage
relation” (qtd. in Cott 50). Divorce codes in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Utah contained similar provisions
(Cott 50; Woolsey 204–06).
In the middle of the century, many states further expanded their divorce laws
by broadening the definition of “cruelty” to include any behavior—including
mental torment—that injured the health of a spouse (Griswold 127–48). The
opinion of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Butler v. Butler (1849)
became the leading decision on this question. “[A] husband,” the court explained,
may, by a course of humiliating insults and annoyances, practiced in
the various forms which ingenious malice could readily devise, eventu-
ally destroy the life or health of his wife, although such conduct may
be unaccompanied by violence, positive or threatened. . . . To hold
absolutely that if a husband avoids positive or threatened personal
violence, the wife has no legal protection against any means short of
these, which he may resort to, and which may destroy her life or health,
is to invite such a system of infliction by the indemnity given the
wrongdoer. (qtd. in Griswold 132)
In the years following this decision, many state courts embraced the idea that
physical decline caused by mental torment justified the dissolution of a marriage.
In accepting “mental cruelty” as grounds for divorce, however, most courts—at
least until the 1880s—required petitioners to show evidence of some type of
physical injury (132–40).
The growing liberalization of the divorce laws, coupled with the problem of
“migratory divorce,” sparked a fierce debate between liberal and conservative
thinkers in the 1860s and ’70s (Basch 80–93; Blake 89–96, 116–123). Proponents
of liberal divorce insisted that mutual happiness was the main purpose of
marriage and that when a union no longer served this end, it ought to be dissolved.
As the former Indiana legislator Robert Dale Owen explained in a famous
exchange with Horace Greeley in March 1860, “marriage was designed to be, and
should be, the means of calling out all that is best and purest in the inner nature
of man.” “[W]hen it becomes the daily source of anger, strifes, cruelty, brutality,”
he insisted, “it defeats God’s purpose, violates the Divine economy, becomes itself
immoral, and ought to cease” (Divorce 55). Owen argued that men and women
should not have to suffer for their poor choices in spouses or their inability to
perceive their partners’ true characters (43–44). James G. Powers echoed these
Portrait of a Lady and the Divorce Debates 159
sentiments a decade later in his treatise Marriage and Divorce (1870). “Marriage
contemplates the development, happiness, and improvement of the married
parties,” he explained. “When this object is defeated by alienation, and such
incurable incompatibility of disposition as leads to daily anger, strife, and
contention,” he reasoned, “it ceases to be a blessing . . . [and] its existence or
continuation . . . ought to cease” (96–97). Elizabeth Cady Stanton advanced this
position, too, in her lectures and published writings. In her view, the parties to a
marriage contract had the right to enter and to exit it at will. As a civil contract,
she explained, marriage ought to be “subject to the laws of all other contracts,
carefully made, the parties of age, and all agreements faithfully observed.” “[I]f
the immoral acts of either party, or insurmountable differences of organization
essentially annul the contract,” she maintained, “the State [ought to] declare it
so” (“Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s Address” 68–69; see also Basch 68–69, 73–
74; Clark 25–54; Stanton 125–30; Stanton, Anthony, and Gage 716–22).
Pro-divorce advocates pointed out, moreover, that strict divorce laws,
rather than liberal ones, encouraged men and women to violate the marriage vow.
Owen insisted that it was not in Indiana but “in New York and New England,
refusing reasonable divorce, that free-love prevails” (Divorce 9). “You have
elopements, adultery, which your law, by rendering it indispensable to release,
virtually encourages,” he charged. “[Y]ou have free-love, and that most terrible
of all social evils, prostitution. We, instead, have regulated, legal separations”
(10). He criticized the wisdom of granting limited divorces that left men and
women in a “nondescript state which is neither married nor single.” Such
separations, he explained, had been found “in practice, to be the most immoral
in [their] tendency” (25) because they tempted the parties to commit adultery.
“[A]ll extra-stringent laws induce a reaction and defeat their own aim,” Powers
similarly warned. “[D]rawing the rein too tightly, it breaks and leaves the rider
at the mercy of the fiery steed” (104; see also 94–95).
Conservative thinkers, by contrast, fumed about the rising divorce rate,
arguing that the availability of easy divorce was undermining the fabric of society
and the stability of domestic life. “[W]hat is Marriage?” Greeley asked in his
debate with Owen. Greeley proceeded to answer his own question:
I mind the Apostolic injunction—“Hold fast to the form of sound
words.”
Dr. Webster’s great dictionary says:
“MARRIAGE: The act of uniting a man and woman for life;
wedlock; the legal union of a man and woman for life.
Marriage is a contract both civil and religious, by which the
parties engage to live together in mutual affection and
fidelity till death shall separate them.” (Divorce 15–16)
According to Greeley, “the entire Christian, and . . . most of the partially civilized
pagan world regard[ed] this solemn contract to cleave to each other till death as
the very essence, the vital element, of Marriage” (16). He strongly opposed the
idea of easing New York’s restrictions on divorce. “That many persons are badly
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mated is true; but that is not the law’s fault,” he insisted (5). In his view, adultery
was the only proper ground for a divorce; he invoked Jesus’ words in the Bible to
support this position (26–27). Greeley approved of separations, too, only as the
New York law permitted them: “in cases where the party thus separated is in
danger of bodily harm from the brutality of an insane, intemperate or otherwise
brutalized, infuriated husband or wife” (28). Individuals who found themselves
miserably deceived about their spouses’ true characters, he felt, ought to suffer the
consequences of their poor decisions. Strict divorce laws, he reasoned, would
force men and women to be more careful and thoughtful about choosing their
partners.
Conservative thinkers like Greeley viewed the rising incidence of divorce as
a sign of the growing individualism that threatened to erode social ties. In
Greeley’s words, “[t]he vice of our age, the main source of its aberrations, is a
morbid Egotism, which overrides the gravest social necessities in its mad pursuit
of individual, personal ends.” “[T]o make divorce easy,” he warned, “is in effect
to invite the sensual and selfish to profane the sanctions of marriage whenever
appetite and temptation may prompt” (48–49). Writing in the North American
Review in June 1880, Nathan Allen sounded the same theme. “When individuals
enter upon the marriage relation under a low range of motives and influences,”
he charged, “they soon develop separate interests that grow wider and wider
apart, resulting in an intense individualism, which is nothing more nor less than
supreme selfishness, and nothing short of a permanent separation will then satisfy
them” (559–60; see also Dike 159–62).
Conservative thinkers worried, too, about the publicity surrounding di-
vorces. “One great evil of this state of things,” Judge Noah Davis lamented, “is
that the public mind is becoming habituated to look upon divorces without shock,
and without a thought of their injury to public morals” (35). He objected, in
particular, to the newspapers’ sensational coverage of divorce trials. “The press
teems with scandalous reports of such suits,” he complained, “often giving
prurient and disgusting details, which the youth of neither sex can safely read; and
thus our conception of the marital relation and its duties is becoming alarmingly
debased” (35).
By the 1870s, Henry James Sr. had come to share this view of the dangers
of liberal divorce, although he had articulated a very different position nearly
twenty years earlier. In 1852, the elder James had himself sparred with Greeley
about the legal regulation of marriage and the proper grounds for divorce. In the
pages of Greeley’s Tribune, James had argued for the expansion of the divorce
laws, explaining that it would strengthen the institution of marriage. As James
then saw it, men and women did not need the “outward force” of law to bind them
to each other; the “human heart [was already] the destined home of constancy and
every courteous affection” (Love, Marriage and Divorce 54). This view of
marriage troubled conservatives and liberals alike. Greeley felt that James’s
suggestion threatened “a general profligacy and corruption such as [the] country
ha[d] never known” (86). The free-lover and philosopher of “individual sover-
eignty” Stephen Pearl Andrews, on the other hand, agreed with many of James’s
proposals but felt that they did not go far enough. After Greeley and Andrews each
Portrait of a Lady and the Divorce Debates 161
wrote several lengthy rebukes, highlighting the radical implications of his ideas,
James retreated from this position.6
In a series of essays published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1870, prompted by
two prominent trials involving adultery and divorce, James Sr. articulated his new
conservative philosophy, criticizing the idea that marriage was a “mere voluntary
tie between men and women, essentially devoid of social obligation, or having at
most only a politico-economical interest to society” (“Woman Thou Gavest” 68–
69). James now highlighted the permanence of the marriage vow, emphasizing the
need to subordinate individual desire to social duty. For the elder James, marriage
was a “strictly social institution” that “contemplate[d] first of all . . . the
advantage of society itself, and through that alone the advantage of all its
individual members” (69; see also “Is Marriage Holy?” 363–64). Like Greeley
now, James strongly objected to the idea that men and women might “take the
marriage law into their own hands, and tighten or relax it at their own pleasure”
(“Woman Thou Gavest” 71).
Where the elder James maintained that the answer to the problem of lax
morals and loose sexual behavior lay in changing people’s views about marriage,
however, most conservative thinkers sought, instead, to change the liberal divorce
laws. Woolsey exhorted “all the churches, all right-minded people, all Protestants
and Catholics, . . . to unite in a demand that there be some check on so great and
threatening an evil” (233).7 Allen similarly called for “wiser and more stringent
legislation upon divorces” (563; see also Cott 106–07). Their demands eventually
resulted in changes. In 1873 the Indiana legislature repealed the omnibus clause
in the state’s divorce code; within the next five years, legislatures in Louisiana,
Arizona, and Connecticut followed suit (Barnett 21–22; Blake 130–51). When
The Portrait of a Lady appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 1880–81, some of the
more liberal provisions had been modified or completely abolished. It became
difficult for unhappy spouses to obtain divorces simply because they had incom-
patible personalities, even in the notorious western states.8 Liberal reformers such
as Stanton, however, would continue to press for change. The desirability of
divorce would remain the subject of fierce debate for many years to come.
The Portrait of a Lady is, in many ways, engaged with these debates. James
handles the subject with great subtlety and skill. The question of the propriety of
divorce never becomes as pronounced in this text as in novels such as William
Dean Howells’s A Modern Instance (1882) and Edith Wharton’s The Custom of
the Country (1913), but it is nonetheless a recurring concern. Portrait, moreover,
does not offer a simple affirmation of James Sr.’s view of marriage, as some critics
have suggested (see Habegger, “Woman” 179; Niemtzow 380). The novel, rather,
bears traces of James’s own ambivalent feelings and changing ideas about divorce.
In the decades prior to writing Portrait, James expressed reservations about
the idea of granting divorces to unhappy couples. James’s disapproval of divorce
emerges forcefully in his review of Louisa May Alcott’s Moods (1864), a novel
that examines the ethical dilemmas that beset Sylvia Yule during her courtship
and marriage. After Sylvia hears a false report that her lover, Adam Warwick, is
engaged to another woman, she agrees to marry a man who cares deeply for her
but for whom she feels little affection. When Adam returns after several months’
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absence to seek Sylvia’s hand in marriage and discovers that she is already married
to his friend, he urges her to obtain a divorce so that they can finally exchange
vows. James recoiled at this suggestion. “When a man beats, starves, or otherwise
misuses his wife, any judicious acquaintance will take the responsibility of
advising the poor woman to seek legal redress,” James explained. “But it is
inconceivable,” he continued, “that a wise and virtuous gentleman should
deliberately persuade two dear friends—dear equally to himself and to each
other—to pick imperceptible flaws in a relation whose inviolability is the great
interest of their lives, and which, from the picture presented to us, is certainly one
of exceptional comfort and harmony” (MD 279). Although James supported the
idea of granting some form of “legal redress” to a wife who suffered from her
husband’s physical abuse, he could not countenance the idea of granting such relief
to a woman who had voluntarily formed a loveless but otherwise acceptable union.
Five years later, James again revealed his commitment to the sanctity and
permanence of the conjugal tie when he endorsed his father’s own conservative
pronouncements on the marriage question. “Your Atlantic article I decidedly
liked—I mean for matter” (HJL 187–88), James wrote to his father in January
1870, after the latter’s first article on the subject appeared. Two months later,
James reiterated his support for his father’s views in a letter to his brother.
“Among the things I have recently read is Father’s Marriage paper in the
Atlantic—with great enjoyment of its manner and approval of its matter” (212),
James related to William.9
In Portrait, however, we see the beginning of a shift in James’s thinking
about the nature of marriage and the propriety of divorce. The novel, in fact,
shares many of the concerns articulated by the liberal reformers. The novel’s
implicit case for divorce begins with the way in which it calls into question
conservatives’ faith that strict divorce laws make people more cautious and
thoughtful about selecting their partners. When Isabel marries Osmond, she is
entirely deceived about his real character. She thinks she is marrying someone
whose mind is curious, generous, and expansive—only to realize, after she is married,
that she has been sorely deceived. In the narrator’s words, “[s]he had taken all the
first steps in the purest confidence, and then she had suddenly found the infinite
vista of a multiplied life to be a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the end”
(PL 474). Isabel’s experience bears out Owen’s concern that an individual with
“unsuspicious faith, just entering a false world, serenely ignorant of its treacher-
ies,” will be even less likely than a person with more wisdom and experience fully
to “penetrate the veil” that conceals others’ true characters (Divorce 43).
Through Isabel’s union with Osmond, moreover, the novel highlights the
importance of the compatibility and happiness of partners in marriage. Isabel and
Osmond discover that their views and interests are utterly at odds. Isabel “ha[s]
a certain way of looking at life which [Osmond takes] as a personal offence” (PL
478). It is “the whole thing—her character, the way she [feels], the way she
judge[s].” The problem is that “his own [is] . . . so different.” The novel evokes
the isolation, anger, and pain that Isabel and Osmond experience in their loveless
union. “[A] gulf had opened between them over which they looked at each other
with eyes that were on either side a declaration of the deception suffered,” the
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narrator observes several years after their marriage. “It was a strange opposition
. . . an opposition in which the vital principle of the one was a thing of contempt
to the other” (474). The representation of consciousness in the novel reinforces
this notion of conjugal discord; Isabel and Osmond remain locked within their
own points of view. For James, as for Owen, Powers, and Stanton, the problem
of conflicting perspectives and incompatible temperaments comes to define the
essence of a miserable marriage.
The consequences of remaining in this union are serious for Isabel, for
Osmond seeks to close the “gulf of difference” (586) between them by subsuming
his wife’s ideas into his own. He expects Isabel “to feel with him and for him, to
enter into his opinions, his ambitions, his preferences” (481). Osmond admires
Isabel’s fine intellect—but only insofar as it reflects back his ideas. “What could
be a happier gift in a companion,” he muses, “than a quick, fanciful mind which
saved one repetitions and reflected one’s thought on a polished, elegant surface?”
(401). Although Isabel has a sharp “mind of her own” (481), Osmond refuses to
recognize it. “My wife has probably expressed to you what we feel,” he tells
Caspar Goodwood when the latter comes to visit them. “[Ralph] Touchett has
been on our minds all winter . . .” (555, emphasis mine). Osmond here erases
Isabel’s separate identity as he struggles to create, through his words, a “perfect
intimacy with his wife.” Even at the “crisis” (582) in their relationship, when
Isabel tells her husband that she must go to England to see her dying cousin,
Osmond clings to a vision of husband and wife as “indissolubly united.” “I’ve an
ideal of what my wife should do and should not do,” he tells her:
She should not travel across Europe alone, in defiance of my deepest
desire, to sit at the bedside of other men. Your cousin’s nothing to you;
he’s nothing to us. You smile most expressively when I talk about us, but
I assure you that we, we, Mrs. Osmond, is all I know. I take our marriage
seriously; you appear to have found a way of not doing so. (583)
This “magnificent form,” this fiction of marital unity, played a crucial role in
nineteenth-century Anglo-American culture. As the English jurist William
Blackstone famously explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England
(1765), “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law.” In
Blackstone’s telling description of “coverture,” the wife’s “very being . . . is
suspended during . . . marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of [her] husband . . .” (430). Osmond reifies this idea, cloaking Isabel’s
person in his name and insisting upon the harmony of their opinions.
In attempting to absorb his wife’s identity into his own, Osmond subjects
Isabel to great emotional pain. James’s language conveys a sense of Isabel’s fear
and suffering. The house to which Osmond confines her is “dark,” “dumb,” and
“suffocat[ing]”; her married life is filled with “terror” (PL 478). When we gain
access to Isabel’s consciousness and view the first few years of her wedded life
through her own eyes, we realize that she “ha[s] lived with [Osmond’s mind], she
ha[s] lived in it almost—it appear[s] to have become her habitation” (477). By
conflating Osmond’s mind with the oppressively dark “mansion of his own
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habitation” (478), the novel vividly portrays the threat that he poses to his wife’s
intellectual liberty. With its sinister Gothic overtones, the image conveys the ways
in which Isabel’s marriage compresses her mental space. The novel further evokes
the pain that Osmond inflicts upon Isabel’s mind when it describes his desire to
“tap her imagination with his knuckle and make it ring” (401). The violent
language that Osmond uses to explain his conception of their unity similarly
highlights his malignity. “[W]hy shouldn’t I speak for her?” he asks Caspar.
“We’re as united, you know, as the candlestick and the snuffers” (552), he
declares, the simile aptly expressing his desire to extinguish his wife’s spirit.
Osmond does not threaten Isabel with physical violence—the text is clear on
this point: “[I]t had not been physical suffering,” the narrator tells us; “for
physical suffering there might have been a remedy” (478). But the novel likens the
emotional pain that Osmond inflicts on Isabel to physical violence and it evokes
the physical suffering that results from such mental anguish. In highlighting the
role that psychological cruelty plays in marital breakdown, the novel makes
visible a problem, as we have seen, that many American courts were recognizing
as grounds for divorce. Like the liberal reformers who called attention to this
problem, and like the judges who responded to it, the novel evinces a deep concern
about women’s emotional well-being in marriage. The focus is where Owen,
Powers, and Stanton insisted that it ought to be: on the individual psyche.
The novel goes far in presenting divorce as a solution to Isabel’s unhappy
situation. Ironically, Osmond himself identifies the remedy that is on so many
people’s minds—articulates the word to which others simply allude. “I’m not
aware that we’re divorced or separated,” he tells Isabel when she threatens to go
to England to see her dying cousin in defiance of his wishes; “for me we’re
indissolubly united” (583). Even as Osmond insists here upon the permanence of
their bond, he introduces the specter of its dissolution. At the same time that he
invokes the legal fiction of marital unity, he acknowledges the growing fissures
that threaten to rupture his conjugal edifice.
Isabel, too, thinks about leaving Osmond and dissolving her vows. Her
desire begins to takes shape in the novel’s revealing forty-second chapter:
She was morally certain now that this feeling of hatred, which at first
had been a refuge and a refreshment, had become the occupation and
comfort of his life. The feeling was deep, because it was sincere; he had
had the revelation that she could after all dispense with him. If to
herself the idea was startling, if it presented itself at first as a kind of
infidelity, a capacity for pollution, what infinite effect might it not be
expected to have had upon him? It was very simple; he despised her; she
had no traditions and the moral horizon of a Unitarian minister. . . .
What was coming—what was before them? That was her constant
question. What would he do—what ought she to do? When a man
hated his wife what did it lead to? (482)
Isabel’s uneasiness at the thought of “dispensing with” Osmond is evident in her
refusal directly to confront it. She imaginatively places the idea in Osmond’s
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mind, focusing on her husband’s perception of her disappointment in marriage,
rather than on her own consciousness of it. Similarly, she concentrates on
Osmond’s anger at her, rather than on her hostility toward him. But the passage
evokes Isabel’s own feelings of shock, resentment, and fear. Not long afterward,
Isabel begins to think more specifically about dissolving her vows. The narrator
explains that Isabel “seemed to see . . . the rapid approach of the day when she
should have to take back something she had solemnly bestown.” As she feels that
“[s]uch a ceremony would be odious and monstrous,” she “trie[s] to shut her eyes
to it meanwhile” (510). When Henrietta later pleads with Isabel to leave Osmond,
Isabel recoils at the suggestion but admits that she “[doesn’t] know what great
unhappiness might bring [her] to . . .” (536). Still later, after she realizes that
Osmond has married her only for her money, she “wonder[s] whether . . . her
money would now satisfy him.” “Would he take her money and let her go?” she
muses (566). Although Isabel also reflects upon the solemnity of her vows, these
meditations may be read as anxious attempts to repress her desire to dissolve her
union. As Isabel acknowledges, she is “[a]fraid of [herself]” (550)—afraid that
she will act upon her desire to leave her husband. The novel seems to be similarly
attracted to this possibility, wishfully dwelling on the idea that Isabel might resort
to the legal remedy.
Although Isabel never does take back her vows in a court of law, the fact that
she thinks about doing so is significant. In depicting a woman who considers
leaving her husband because of his incompatible temperament and emotional
cruelty, the novel departs from the tradition of American divorce fiction. Most
novels about matrimonial discord published prior to Portrait criticize the ease
with which spouses are able to dissolve their vows; they suggest that divorce is not
the answer to conjugal strife (Barnett 69–81; Basch 176–85; French 92–96;
MacComb, Tales 10–30). The texts typically present divorce as a necessary, albeit
problematic, remedy only when it is sought in response to behavior such as
adultery or physical cruelty. In The Divorce (1851), for example, Eliza Dupy
reluctantly endorses her heroine’s fraught decision to divorce her spouse, but
unlike Gilbert Osmond, this man is both unfaithful and physically abusive. T. S.
Arthur’s The Hand but Not the Heart (1858) offers a slightly more radical
solution than most texts. Arthur suggests that his unhappily married heroine is
justified in leaving her temperamental husband and going back to live with her
aunt after he wrongly accuses her of infidelity. Arthur also suggests, however, that
she is right in continuing to view her vows as binding, even after her husband
divorces her, and right in waiting until he dies before she remarries. Even Alcott’s
Moods (1864), which dwells upon the anguish of living in a loveless union,
suggests the impossibility of its heroine’s resorting to divorce as a way out of her
unhappy marriage.10 Unlike most of her literary sisters, Isabel repeatedly thinks
about leaving her husband—indeed, yearns to be released from her marriage—
and the novel depicts her desire for freedom in a largely sympathetic light.
Although Isabel does not act upon her desire to leave Osmond, moreover,
other women in the novel explore alternatives to remaining in unhappy unions.
These alternatives form an important part of the novel’s implicit case for divorce.
The Touchetts’ “experiment in matrimony” (PL 66), we remember, is a failure.
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“It . . . become[s] clear, at an early stage of their community,” the narrator
explains, “that they should never desire the same thing at the same moment” (75).
Unlike Isabel, Mrs. Touchett takes matters into her own hands. She refuses to
accept the fiction of marital unity when there is no harmony in her marriage.
When she realizes that she and Mr. Touchett cannot agree about anything, she
leaves him and does “what she [can] to erect [their separation] into a law.” They
live apart from one another much as if they had been granted a limited divorce:
they neither remarry nor begin relationships with new partners. Madame Merle
similarly negotiates her own unofficial separation from her husband; he goes to
South America, she to Europe. Unlike Mrs. Touchett, though, Madame Merle
does not remain faithful to her spouse. The Countess Gemini, too, feels tied to a
horrid husband—a “brute” (330). In her view, marriage is a “steel trap” (406).
Like Madame Merle, she consoles herself by indulging her illicit passion; how-
ever, she does not restrict herself to one man. These women’s experiences heighten
the anxiety about wedded life that builds up around Isabel’s union with Osmond,
providing further evidence that, in Ralph Touchett’s words, “[t]here’s no more
usual basis of union than a mutual misunderstanding” (198).
These experiences also suggest the limits of the law’s ability to regulate
sexual relations. Unhappy spouses in this novel do not remain united simply
because they are unable to obtain legal redress. Mrs. Touchett attempts to draw
a line around her unconventional separation, struggling to distinguish her
behavior from that of other, less circumspect women. She prides herself on “the
fact that though [she has] lived much abroad and mingled . . . in foreign life, [she
has] never exhibited the smallest preference for any one else” (258). She is
appalled at the thought of associating with women who are unfaithful to their
husbands and thus she shuns the Countess Gemini, Osmond’s notorious sister.
Adultery, though, casts a dark shadow over Mrs. Touchett’s life as well as over
the novel as a whole. Despite Mrs. Touchett’s attempts to avoid the company of
unfaithful women, she seems inevitably to mingle with them. Madame Merle,
herself an adulteress, launches into a lengthy argument with Mrs. Touchett in an
attempt to persuade her to admit the Countess Gemini into her “circle”:
She couldn’t see why Mrs. Touchett should make a scapegoat of a
woman who had really done no harm, who had only done good in the
wrong way. One must certainly draw the line, but while one was about
it one should draw it straight: it was a very crooked chalk-mark that
would exclude the Countess Gemini. In that case Mrs. Touchett had
better shut up her house; this perhaps would be the best course so long
as she remained in Florence. One must be fair and not make arbitrary
differences: the Countess had doubtless been imprudent, she had not
been so clever as other women. She was a good creature, not clever at
all; but since when had that been a ground of exclusion from the best
society? (329)
This passage wonderfully blurs the boundary between “pure” and “impure”
women, highlighting the futility of Mrs. Touchett’s attempt to maintain clear
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distinctions between them. Inside the house—the image of domesticity in the
nineteenth century—we find one woman who lives “virtually separated” (75)
from her husband, another woman who left her husband and promptly began a
relationship with another man, and a third woman who continues to live with her
husband but who regularly indulges her illicit desires. The passage shows the
difficulty of drawing the line at Mrs. Touchett’s unofficial separation. When
couples work out their own solutions to their marital troubles, the novel shows,
they create and abide by their own laws. There is no way to ensure that such
spouses will remain faithful to each other. Like the liberal reformers, the novel
evinces deep concerns about the prevalence of miserable marriages and the
frequency with which couples devise their own solutions to their matrimonial
woes. The novel seems imaginatively to reach for a remedy that will put an end
to this conjugal chaos.
If The Portrait of a Lady raises the possibility that divorce is an appropriate
remedy for unhappy couples, however, it ultimately backs away from it. At the
same time that the novel implicitly sympathizes with the views articulated by the
liberal reformers, it shares many of the concerns voiced by the conservative critics.
Specifically, it highlights the sanctity of marriage and the importance of placing
social duties above individual desires. As critics have noted, Isabel repeatedly
contemplates the sacredness of her vows. Toward the end of the novel, after Isabel
reflects upon the misery that constitutes her conjugal life, she dutifully reminds
herself that Osmond is her “appointed and inscribed master”:
[S]he gazed at moments with a sort of incredulous blankness at this
fact. It weighed upon her imagination, however; constantly present to
her mind were all the traditional decencies and sanctities of marriage.
The idea of violating them filled her with shame as well as with dread,
for on giving herself away she had lost sight of this contingency in the
perfect belief that her husband’s intentions were as generous as her
own. (510)
A few chapters later, when Henrietta suggests that Isabel leave her husband, Isabel
again articulates this sense of mingled shame and responsibility. “I don’t know
what great unhappiness might bring me to,” she admits, “but it seems to me I shall
always be ashamed. One must accept one’s deeds. I married him before all the
world; I was perfectly free; it was impossible to do anything more deliberate”
(536). When Osmond informs Isabel that he is “not aware that [they are] divorced
or separated” and that, in his eyes, they are “indissolubly united,” the narrator
observes that his words represent “something transcendent and absolute, like the
sign of the cross or the flag of one’s country” (583). He speaks “in the name of
something sacred and precious—the observation of a magnificent form.” As
Isabel reflects upon Osmond’s angry words, struggling to reconcile herself to his
wish that she not go to England to see her dying cousin, she reminds herself that
“they [are] married . . . and marriage mean[s] that a woman should cleave to the
man with whom, uttering tremendous vows, she had stood at the altar” (586).
These statements reflect, in part, a theological objection to divorce, as the
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religious imagery running through them suggests. Although Isabel and Osmond
are American citizens, they reside in Italy, after all, and the Catholic view of
marriage as an indissoluble bond hovers in the background of the text. Yet the
statements also evoke a secular faith in the importance of honoring one’s
commitments—the need, in Osmond’s words, to “accept the consequences of
[one’s] actions” (583).
Outside the world of the novel, we remember, conservative thinkers like
Greeley, Woolsey, and Allen held up the conjugal tie as the model for all other
binding agreements. Emphasizing the relationship between fidelity in marriage
and stability in society, they strongly objected to Stanton’s attempt to apply a
commercial theory of contract to the conjugal relation. Allen denounced the way
in which marriage had come to be “regarded more as simply a civil contract”—
“a kind of partnership intended only for the convenience and interests of the
parties concerned” (558). “Instead of correcting . . . the individualizing tendency
of modern law and modern economic forces,” Reverend Samuel Dike similarly
complained, the “lax system of divorce” only hastened it (160).
In The Portrait of a Lady, James implicitly affirms this commitment to
marriage as a model for other binding relationships, criticizing those spouses who
place their own desires above their conjugal duties. Whereas Isabel reminds
herself of the sanctities and the obligations involved in marriage, Mrs. Touchett—
like Stanton—applies the logic of the business contract to her conjugal life. Mrs.
Touchett perceives nothing irregular about the way she lives, “virtually separated
from her husband” (PL 75). In her view, one forms a marriage as one “go[es] into
partnership—to set up a house” (385). She walks away from her matrimonial
“experiment” (66) much as she would from an imprudent business agreement.
Not surprisingly, she views Isabel’s own “establishment” as a “lame business”
(441–42). These ideas unsettle James’s heroine. Isabel is uncomfortable about the
way in which her aunt blurs the boundary between the commercial and the
conjugal realms, muddying the distinction between transitory, self-interested
transactions, on the one hand, and permanent, affective ties, on the other. She
disagrees with her aunt’s conception of marriage as an agreement that ought to
last only as long as it benefits the parties. Isabel articulates James’s view; he
suggests that Mrs. Touchett’s radical individualism is problematic. Mrs. Touchett
is too “fond” of “her own [ways]” (75); she never thinks of anyone’s needs besides
her own. Through its portrait of Mrs. Touchett, the novel highlights the problem
of applying contract logic to intimate relationships.11
The novel draws back from the idea of divorce, moreover, because of the
close public scrutiny that such proceedings seem necessarily to entail. When
Henrietta initially counsels Isabel to leave Osmond, James’s heroine recoils from
the suggestion. “I can’t publish my mistake. I don’t think that’s decent. I’d much
rather die” (536), she explains. When Henrietta continues to press Isabel on this
point, the latter confides, “I don’t like [Osmond], I can tell you, because I’m weary
of my secret. But that’s enough; I can’t announce it on the housetops.” Isabel’s
reply conveys her sense of vulnerability in the face of such public exposure. A
reporter, Henrietta has “no sense of privacy” (140); she thinks nothing of prying
into people’s personal lives and divulging the details of their conjugal misery.
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Published in a period in which people flocked to courtrooms to observe divorce
trials and in which journalists printed racy accounts of these proceedings (Basch
147–76; Leckie 62–111), Portrait highlights the importance of maintaining
privacy in matters of conjugal relations.
The novel, then, is simultaneously attracted to and troubled by the idea that
unhappy spouses might turn to the law for relief. Like the writings and speeches
of Owen, Powers, and Stanton, Portrait places great importance on emotional
happiness and compatibility in conjugal life. James vividly depicts the psychologi-
cal costs of Isabel’s miserable marriage, bringing them sharply into focus and
insisting that her mental anguish matters. He suggests, too, that strict divorce laws
do not prevent unhappy couples from working out their own solutions to their
marital troubles and even violating their vows. Like Greeley, Woolsey, Allen, and
James Sr., however, the younger James nonetheless remains invested in the
sanctity, permanence, and privacy of marriage. He is, I am suggesting, keenly
aware of the psychological costs of remaining in a miserable union, but he is also
deeply concerned about the moral and social implications of liberal divorce laws.
The novel struggles to resolve the tension between the liberal and the conservative
positions in the divorce debates, attempting to adjudicate the competing claims of
the Individual and Society.
In the end, the concerns of Society trump those of the Individual. Isabel does
not follow Henrietta’s advice and turn to America’s liberal divorce courts to
dissolve her unhappy union with Osmond. The “great alkali desert of cheap
Divorce” (134), as James would describe the western states in The Golden Bowl
(1904), remains only a vague, unrealized presence in this text. Despite all of the
hints that James gives us that Isabel may eventually resort to this remedy, he does
not write a sensational courtroom scene into the end of his novel, as Howells
would do in A Modern Instance.12 In the final pages of Portrait, Isabel does not
take back the vows she has solemnly bestown—and we sense that she never will.
By 1911, James appears to have struck a different balance between the
opposing claims of the Individual and Society. That year he would advise his
friend Edith Wharton to obtain a divorce from her mentally unstable and
unpredictable husband, Teddy, who had subjected her to considerable anguish for
years. “[W]ith the recurrence of scenes of violence you must insist on saving your
life by a separate existence,” he wrote to her in July of that year. “You must
trancher at all costs. Those scenes are by the nature of the case recurrent,” he
observed, “— & on that you must take your stand” (EW 182). Two years later,
after she obtained a divorce from a French court, he wrote her that he “delight[ed]
in . . . [her] definite liberation, signed & sealed (oh blest consummation!)” (251–
52).13
In 1881, however, James could not bring himself to endorse divorce as a
solution for his unhappy heroine—could not imagine a “separate existence” for
Isabel. Near the end of Portrait, Isabel acts upon the Countess Gemini’s advice
and, in defiance of Osmond’s wishes, rushes to the bedside of her dying cousin in
England. But James brings Isabel only to this tentative break with Osmond. In the
final pages of the novel, we find her anxiously reflecting upon her obligations as
a wife, struggling to convince herself that she should return to her spouse:
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She had a husband in a foreign city, counting the hours of her absence;
in such a case one needed an excellent motive. He was not one of the
best husbands, but that didn’t alter the case. Certain obligations were
involved in the very fact of marriage, and were quite independent of the
quality of enjoyment extracted from it. (PL 626)
The ambiguity surrounding the word “motive” captures Isabel’s conflicted
feelings about her union: although it appears that Isabel needs an “excellent
motive” to remain in England while her husband waits impatiently for her to
return to Rome, the passage also suggests that she needs an excellent reason to go
back to him. The compulsory and violent language that James uses to describe
Isabel’s conception of marriage further conveys her anxiety about returning to
Osmond. In this passage, as earlier in the novel, Isabel reviews her conjugal
obligations in an effort to convince herself that she ought to perform them.
Just at this moment, though, Isabel’s frustratingly persistent American
suitor Caspar Goodwood arrives and begins pleading with her to come away with
him and to forget her husband. “Why should you go back—why should you go
through that ghastly form?” he asks her:
What have you to care about? You’ve no children; that perhaps would
be an obstacle. As it is you’ve nothing to consider. You must save what
you can of your life; you mustn’t lose it all simply because you’ve lost
a part. It would be an insult to you to assume that you care for the look
of the thing, for what people will say, for the bottomless idiocy of the
world. We’ve nothing to do with all that; we’re quite out of it; we look
at things as they are. You took the great step in coming away; the next
is nothing; it’s the natural one. I swear, as I stand here, that a woman
deliberately made to suffer is justified in anything in life—in going
down into the streets if that will help her! I know how you suffer, and
that’s why I’m here. (635)
It is not clear whether Caspar wants Isabel to obtain a divorce or wants her simply
to engage in an illicit relationship with him, but his proposal threatens her
marriage either way. In his view, a woman, like her, who is “made to suffer” is
justified in doing “anything.” “We can do absolutely as we please” (635), he
insists, articulating an even more extreme version of the philosophy that Henrietta
introduces one hundred pages earlier. His proposal, however, does not offer
Isabel a way out of her dilemma. Caspar has always threatened Isabel’s freedom.
Now, as before, he seeks to take “possession” of her (636). By presenting Caspar
as the only alternative to Osmond, the novel significantly diminishes the appeal
of Isabel’s contemplated flight.
Although it seems fairly clear that Isabel will return to Osmond, she darts
out of the portrait’s frame at the end before we can be certain of the final steps
that she will take. She leaves us forever in the moment of running away, poised
on the brink of a decision. The novel remains poised between alternatives in much
the same way that Isabel does.14 Acknowledging the power of Henrietta’s
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subversive suggestion to Isabel even as it attempts to prevent the journalist from
articulating her argument, the novel makes visible contradictory strains in
American culture as well as tensions in James’s own ideas about marriage. In
Portrait, James resists the idea of dissolving the conjugal tie at the same time that
he continually reaches toward it.
NOTES
I would like to thank Pericles Lewis, Thomas Otten, and Ruth Yeazell for insightful comments
on earlier versions of this essay.
1The key arguments in the debates are found in Divorce; “Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s
Address”; Stanton; Stanton, Anthony, and Gage (716–22, 738–40, 860–61); and Woolsey. For an
overview of the divorce debates in nineteenth-century America, see Barnett (33–61); Basch (68–93);
Blake (80–115); Cott (105–11); and Gordon (840–46).
2For other examples of this strain in the critical literature, see Holland (41–42); Niemtzow;
and White (68–69). Some scholars simply sidestep the issue altogether, noting that “in the 1870s
divorce was not really an option for a woman” (Fowler 77; see also Bell 88). Critics have, by contrast,
been attentive to the ways in which divorce informs James’s later works. In his seminal study of the
marriage plot in Anglo-American fiction, for example, Boone observes that James “spent his
novelistic career plotting fictions that chipped away at the constraints imposed on theme and form
by the marriage tradition” (186), but he discusses Portrait only in passing, noting that this novel
gestures toward the more open-ended plots that James would construct in his later fiction. In
discussing the plight of James’s eponymous heroine in What Maisie Knew (1897)—a novel that begins
with a brief but powerful account of litigation culminating in the divorce of Maisie’s parents—Theroux,
too, reminds us of James’s interest in the dissolution of the marriage vow (7–8). Other critics have
drawn more subtle connections between James’s late fiction and the divorce court. Leckie, for
example, offers suggestive links between the epistemological questions that figured significantly in
late-nineteenth-century divorce trials and the problems of knowledge that underlie James’s depiction
of marital discord in The Golden Bowl (1904) (Leckie 154–201; see also Tintner 258–62).
3The pioneering study of “the American divorce novel” is Barnett. Barnett, however, discusses
only “novels in which divorce actually occurs or is specifically indicated,” and he limits his texts to
those “written by American authors utilizing American characters and usually American scenes” (12,
10). By defining this sub-genre too narrowly, Barnett leaves out important texts, such as Portrait.
4The provisions of this Act remained intact until 1923 (Stone 388–401). Isabel, though, could
not obtain legal redress in England anyway, as she has not lived in England with Osmond and thus
would not come within the reach of the English courts.
5For an overview of American divorce law in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Basch
(43–67) and Blake (48–63).
6For Henry James Sr.’s dispute with Greeley, see Blake (82–86) and Love, Marriage and
Divorce. For a discussion of the elder James’s changing ideas about marriage and divorce and their
influence upon his son, see Habegger, “Bostonians” (323–42); Habegger, “Woman” (179–80); and
Niemtzow (377–80).
7Henry James Sr. viewed Woolsey’s treatise as a “hopeless plea for a return to the Christian
law of divorce.” “I am persuaded, for my own part,” he wrote, “that the only hope of good men like
President Woolsey, who cherish purity and order in the sexual relations, and are, therefore, utterly
bewildered by any present outlook in that direction, is in looking forwards, not backwards. These
great ends are to be promoted, not by any legislation whatever, but only by the increased energy and
diffusion of the social sentiment” (“Woman Thou Gavest” 70; see also “Logic”). On the role of law
in the elder James’s thought, see Hartog (246–47).
8MacComb exaggerates the availability of divorce in the western states in late-nineteenth-
century America, overlooking the conservative backlash that took place after 1870 (Tales 69).
9It is unclear, when James alludes to his “Father’s Marriage paper,” whether he is referring to
his father’s second essay, “Is Marriage Holy?,” which appeared in the March 1870 issue of the
Atlantic Monthly, or to his father’s first essay, “The Woman Thou Gavest with Me,” which appeared
in the January 1870 issue. James was abroad during this period and may not have seen a copy of his
father’s second essay before he wrote this letter to William. Both of the Atlantic essays, however,
convey the elder James’s view of the sanctity and permanence of marriage.
10Nineteenth-century English novels also rarely present divorce as a solution for unhappy
wives. As Humpherys has shown, most English texts—at least until the last few decades of the
nineteenth century—resolve the problem of marital conflict through the death of one of the spouses,
without raising the possibility of a legal remedy. When the novels depict divorces or separations, the
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results are usually disastrous for women (42–56). Only in the sensation fiction of the 1860s and ’70s
do English authors experiment with more subversive possibilities, such as bigamy (Chase and
Levenson 201–13; Humpherys 45). For an insightful discussion of the influence of the English divorce
court and the emerging doctrine of “mental cruelty” on George Eliot’s fiction, see Dowling. Although
Eliot’s unhappy heroines do not leave their husbands, her novels nonetheless shed light, as Dowling
astutely shows, on the psychological dimension of marital conflict (322–36), providing a precedent
for James’s own study of conjugal discord.
11Thomas similarly argues that in The Bostonians (1886) James “challenges those radicals
who demanded that husband and wife be considered free and equal contracting parties, like those
entering into a business contract” (736). “Rather than use the business contract as a model for
reforming the marriage contract,” Thomas explains, “[James] uses the imbalances that critics noted
in the marriage contract to suggest that such imbalances inhabit all exchanges.” For an insightful
discussion of the blurring of sexual and economic relations in Edith Wharton’s divorce fiction and
in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American culture more generally, see Bentley (160–
211).
12In a diary entry for August 18, 1882, Howells noted that he and James had walked home
together that day through the streets of London, James “talking to me most of the way about A Mod.
Instance, wh. he is reading” (LFL 173). The following day, on August 19, James sent Howells a quick
note about the latter’s work. “Your novel is admirable to the end, (which I haven’t quite reached,)
of an extraordinary reality,” he wrote to Howells. “I will talk to you about it. It is the Yankee
Romola!” (223–24). James’s ambiguous comment offers no insight into his view of Howells’s
treatment of divorce, although he evidently discerned a similarity between Howells’s work and
George Eliot’s novel because of their shared concern with adultery and marital discord.
13Wharton obtained her divorce because of Teddy’s adultery (Johnson 949). In urging
Wharton to obtain legal redress, however, James alludes only to Teddy’s cruelty. The violence in
Wharton’s marriage to which James refers appears to have been emotional, rather than physical.
James followed all of Wharton’s marital troubles closely and offered her unfailing support (see EW
101, 108, 131, 183).
14Critics have long struggled to make sense of the novel’s ending. In suggesting that Isabel’s
decision to return to Osmond signals an “acceptance of suffering” (Fowler 78) and a realization that
marriage does not necessarily bring happiness (Stein 138–39), Fowler and Stein overlook the novel’s
deep concerns about Isabel’s unhappy union. MacComb, on the other hand, reads the ending too
optimistically, arguing that Isabel’s “return [to Osmond] promises the sort of engagement and
negotiation that might win an equality within marriage” (Tales 77). Both of these positions underes-
timate the novel’s profound disenchantment with and critique of Isabel’s marriage.
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